BEFORE THE 1 POLLUTION CONTROL HEARINGS BOARD STATE OF WASHINGTON 2 3 IN THE MATTER OF CITY OF PASCO, A MUNICIPAL PCHB No. 80-99 CORPORATION, 4 Appellant, ORDER REMANDING DOCKET 5 No. DE 80-255 TO THE DEPARTMENT OF ECOLOGY AND 6 v. DENYING APPELLANT'S STATE OF WASHINGTON, MOTION TO DISMISS 7 DEPARTMENT OF ECOLOGY, 8 (FINAL ORDER) Respondent. 9

This matter came before the Pollution Control Hearings Board, Nat Washington, chairman, and David Akana (presiding) on February 3, 1981 in Lacey, Washington.

Appellant was represented by Dennis J. DeFelice, City Attorney; respondent was represented by Charles Douthwaite, Assistant Attorney General. Court reporter Betty Koharski recorded the proceedings.

This matter brings for resolution a Motion to Dismiss on several

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grounds brought by appellant. If the motion was granted, respondent's Order DE 80-255 would be vacated; if the motion was denied, Order DE 80-255 would be remanded to respondent, as agreed by the parties, to establish different construction dates. Appellant's motion to reconsider prehearing order was denied at hearing.

Having considered the amended notice of appeal, the memorandum in support of respondent's motion for summary judgment, appellant's memorandum in opposition thereto and in support of appellant's motion to dismiss, respondent's reply to memorandum, appellant's second memorandum in support of motion to dismiss, respondent's reply to second memorandum, the affidavits filed, appellant's motion to dismiss, the file and record herein, and argument of counsel, the Board concludes that the motion to dismiss should be denied.

- 1. Insufficiency of process. The Board has jurisdiction over the matter relating to the appeal of Docket No. DE 80-255. Appellant's reliance on RCW 4.28.080(2) and Meadowdale Neighborhood Committee v. Edmonds, 27 Wn.App. 261 (1980) requiring service of process by delivery of a copy of a summons to the mayor in order to acquire jurisdiction over the city is not well placed. The appropriate statute in this matter is RCW 90.48.120(2) which does not require service of an order or directive on any specified city official. See In re Saltis, 94 Wn.2d 889 (1980). Additionally, RCW 90.48.120(2) does not require that a Notice of Violation precede an order or directive.
- 2. Authority to impose condition S2. The discharge of any pollutant by any person is unlawful unless in compliance with a NPDES

permit. 33 U.S.C. sections 1311, 1342. Under the Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C. section 1251 et seq (FWPCA), a permit system is established requiring that any discharge of pollutants be pursuant to a permit issued by the federal government or by an EPA-approved state agency. Respondent has assumed the federal permit-issuing role. RCW 90.48.260; WAC 173-220; 39 Fed. Reg. 26061 (1974). Pederson v. Department of Transportation, 25 Wn.App. 781 (1980).

Appellant's filter backwash is a "pollutant" being discharged within the meaning of WAC 173-220-030(7) and 33 U.S.C. section 1362(6). Therefore a NPDES permit is required for the discharge of the silt. Pederson, supra.

Respondent has the authority to include a technology-based effluent limitation in a NPDES permit (condition S2 herein) even though the U.S. EPA has not promulgated an appropriate guideline. 40 CFR 125.3(a, c). WAC 173-220-130(1)(f). Reconsideration of the substance of condition S2 is not now before us because of jurisdictional limitations of the Board. 2

²⁰ l. The broad scope of "pollutant" is supported by the all-encompassing meaning of "pollution:" "the manmade or man induced alteration of the chemical, physical, biological and radiological integrity of water." 33 U.S.C. section 1362 (19). See RCW 90.48.020. Appellant's system removes water from the river for sale

^{90.48.020.} Appellant's system removes water from the river for sale in a commercial sense. The silt from the filter is returned to the river without the original volumes of water removed.

^{2.} See Prehearing Order dated December 22, 1980. See Costle v. Pacific Legal Foundation, 100 S.Ct. 1095, 1106-1108, (1980).

- 3. Existence of Permit WA-000376-0. Permits are valid for not more than five years from the date of issuance. RCW 90.48.180. See RCW 90.48.260. See FWPCA section 402(b)(l)(B). The statutory provision finds expression in WAC 173-220-180. That regulation also provides for application for "replacement to existing permits or continuation of discharges after the expiration date" of a permit by filing an application. The effect of such application is that the existing permit does not expire until the application has been finally determined. RCW 34.04.170(l); RCW 90.48.230; .260 and .262. By making application for renewal of an existing permit or continuation of discharges, appellant continues the existence of NPDES Permit WA-000376-04 and any order issued relative to that permit such as Docket No. DE 80-255.
- 4. Arbitrary and Capricious Action. By agreement of the parties at the prehearing conference, Docket No. DE 80-255 would be remanded to DOE to modify the compliance period in the event that respondent was found to have the necessary authority to include condition S2 in the NPDES permit. Respondent has been determined to have such authority. Accordingly the matter should be remanded to DOE for further consideration and appellant's claim of arbitrary and capricious action need not be considered on the merits or in a motion to dismiss in light of the agreement to remand.

^{3.} Appellant's reliance on RCW 90.48.200 is misplaced in light of RCW 90.48.260 and .262 which override contrary provisions of ch. 90.48 RCW.

^{4.} The federal law reaches a similar result. See 5 U.S.C. section 558(c). See Costle v. Pacific Legal Foundation, 100 S.Ct. 1095 (1980), n. 10.

1	5. Order. Appellant's motion is denied and the matter is remanded
2	to respondent for further consideration. 5
3	DATED this with day of March, 1981.
4	POLLUTION CONTROL HEARINGS BOARD
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6	NAT W. WASHINGTON, Chairman
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8	David alian
9	DAVID AKANA, Member
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18	5. As a practical matter, the new construction schedule could be

ORDER REMANDING & DENYING
APPELLANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS

^{5.} As a practical matter, the new construction schedule could be set forth in a new NPDES permit. At that time DOE may consider matters other than the construction schedule, such as the continuing necessity of condition S2.

1 CERTIFICATION OF MAILING I, Jean Rappuhn, certify that I mailed, postage prepaid, copies 2 of the foregoing document on the 6th day of March, 1981, to each of 3 the following parties at the last known post office addresses with 4 the proper postage affixed to the respective envelopes: 5 6 Dennis J. DeFelice Pasco City Attorney 7 P.O. Box 293 Pasco, WA 99301 8 Charles K. Douthwaite 9 Asst. Attorney General Department of Ecology 10 St. Martin's College Olympia, WA 98504 11 Lloyd Taylor 12 Department of Ecology St. Martin's College 13 Olympia, WA 98504 14 Honorable J.C. Dailie Mayor, City of Pasco 15 P.O. Box 293 Pasco, WA 99301 16 17 18 19 POULUTION CONTROL HEARINGS BOARD 20 21 22 23 24 25 26